Our western borders may temporarily cease being hostile, simmering hostility by disparate groups inimical to Pakistan will persist. Consequently the evoking of dormant activists within Pakistan cannot be ruled out. We must retain credible deterrence capability for both the Eastern and Western fronts. The difference between the two fronts is in the nature of the threats. Notwithstanding the four decades-long proxy war conducted by India using different players with Afghanistan as a platform, viz first the Soviet Union 1980-1990 and the US 2000-2021, the Eastern front demands capability to handle the full and broad spectrum of conventional threat.
Enhancing our security potential should not be confined to containment only but by reorganizing/upgrading the Armed Forces with mobility, agility and ensuring a minimum teeth-to-tail ratio in light of the US Afghanistan experience which force-multiplying both the capability of our Frontier Corps (FCs) and Rangers to eliminate likely threats from becoming dangerous to our existence. We must also beef up capability of our civilian LEAs including having a “Military Secretary’s (MS) Branch” as in GHQ for career planning, postings and promotions, etc for the police. Not having it is patently ridiculous, it allows politicians to manipulate and persist with a criminal feudal system!
The geography of the area, the disparate composition of the population straddling the border, religious extremism of disparate nature, their developed capability of hostile forces, coupled with the exit of US forces from Afghanistan, though emotionally desirable for us reinforces the necessity of increasing caution. Despite a lot of lip-service and rhetoric about the “National Action Plan”, it has not been fully implemented. Terrorist sleeper cells have been ignored, some because of lack of political will. These can be activated almost effortlessly with dire consequences for the population for our urban areas. Out-of-box solutions are urgently required to handle the pressing inherent and immediate challenges, inaction by the quarters responsible will be criminal neglect of their duties.
Raising new FC wings will not only enhance border security but maintain law and order in adjacent tribal area in both KPK and Balochistan Provinces. Coupled with that is the need of enhancing the Rangers’ capability with reinforced intelligence potential to contain and eradicate possible terrorist activity in urban areas of Punjab and Sindh. Unfortunately, there is no time to carry out new raisings and train recruits to the requisite capability. Since the Command structure on the Western front is in place, therefore new raising of a few additional FC wings to double the existing strength under the existing HQ’s will plug essential gaps. One more FC HQ should be raised in north for FATA and Sindh similar to what has been done in Balochistan in the South. For internal security, essential raisings must be undertaken for the LEA’s, not only for the Rangers but also the police and the lower judiciary (i.e. round-the-clock magistrates at all police stations).
A fact normally glossed over is that our solders retire at young age between mid-thirties and early forties while officers of the rank of major retire at less than mid-forties. In the civilian sector nearly all need a job, while the market is not vibrant or large enough to absorb the vast number being retired. This huge resource and reservoir of trained manpower can conveniently be utilized for necessary raising of additional FC wings and LEA’s. Those due for retirement can be given the option of continuing their service upto 55 (or even 58) years as part of FC’s or LEA’s. This option will be very attractive for these men as at this stage of life they are cast out in the cold and are in dire need of starting a new career. As part of this scheme if these men are adjusted in their own province/districts, then this option will become even more attractive. The next issue is of conversion training for these people from all three services to their new job. For the job required requirement as FC or Ranger of normal infantry or mechanized infantry rank and file they really do not need any training. Specialists retiring from the Engineer Corps, Signal Corps, etc can easily fill specialist jobs. Because of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism experience the composite service potential of already trained manpower with requisite experience is invaluable. Filling of posts in local magistracy or investigative police may require short courses of 2-3 months which should be sufficient to impart this training. This will incur minimal expenditure, by stopping new recruitment enormous training costs will be saved.
This will take care of another major problem. For Pakistan the defence-related expenditure has swelled phenomenally. My article “The Ticking Pension Bomb” of Oct 16, 2020 alludes to some pragmatic solutions of great concern is the expense of pensions which currently stands at Rs.470 billion. Whatever head this expense is parked in for accounting purposes, where are the revenues to meet the expenditures in the near future? While plans to make the pension fund self-sustaining needs a separate and detailed study, we have to enhance our defensive capability, particularly on the western front. Notwithstanding these constraints, present day challenges have to be met.
To enhance the operational efficiency of this set up, we must have the capability of collecting real time information through electronic coverage of crossing points and the fence border (a well-constructed brilliant idea). Intelligence collection through electronics is becoming efficient and the domestic industry can contribute to this. This should be coupled with human intelligence, intelligence personnel being available in good number, to cover both the borders and towns in depth. Human intelligence (humint) requires developed skills and good facilities.
A separate Force HQ under GHQ may be raised as “Homeland Security” to take over command of the new FC and Ranger HQs. This force can operate under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), operational and administrative control remaining with GHQ. The implementation of this proposal will accrue many advantages (1) will defer by about 15 years the amount spent on commuted pension (this time can be gainfully used to revamp the pension system to become self-sustaining) (2) will utilize the full productivity of personnel who have been fully trained (3) will enhance the capability of our forces to immediately handle the threat from the western front (if it materializes as a consequence of poor law and order situation in that country) (4) will save cost on creating training institutions by utilizing existing centers and schools (5) continuous stream of trained manpower for FC’s and other LEA’S will remain available, (6) incentivize enrollment of men in the Armed Forces and (7) can be implemented in minimum time with minimum expense. While we presently (1) must learn from the 21st century war experience and (2) have the capability of defending both our ideological and territorial integrity we cannot depend on anyone else. It will be in the interest of all world powers to supp ort our efforts.
Proposed steps taken in time will display our resolve to guard our frontiers. It will deter any adverse initiatives by anti-Pakistan forces who still retain their networks to operate from across our western borders. Already trained manpower will be much more efficient and inexpensive compared to new raisings, which remains both cost and time prohibitive option
